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* I particularly wish to thank Mr Alasdair Scott, Economics Department, Reserve Bank of New Zealand for the
considerable assistance he has provided to me in the writing of this paper.2
Ladies and Gentlemen
Introduction
Thank you for your kind welcome.
I have been asked to give my perspective on inflation targeting.  The first point I can note is
that you, an audience of professional economists, have turned up to listen to a central banker.
So an obvious question presents itself: does the practice of inflation targeting reflect sound
economic principles?  Certainly, the inflation-targeting regime in New Zealand has been
subject to considerable academic scrutiny along these lines.  I suggest, however, that some
other questions are more interesting for today’s discussion.  Have we made progress in the
practice of monetary policy?  Have we learnt anything about inflation targeting along the way?
And what is the way forward?
I’m going to use these questions to define the main themes of my address.  I will argue that an
inflation-targeting framework is not the same as a day-to-day policy for inflation-targeting.
There is at least as much to learn about how to work within an inflation-targeting framework
as establishing the framework itself.  I will also argue that one of the main challenges we face
as policy makers is confronting uncertainty, and it is here that I see a significant opportunity
for academic economists to make more contributions to the practice of monetary policy.
To put some substance on this argument, I will refer often to the New Zealand experience.  I
hope you will forgive me if you think I am indulging in a history lesson, but it has much to do
with where we are today.
Toward the Reserve Bank Act and beyond
Many of you will be aware that New Zealand passed legislation in 1989 that granted the
Reserve Bank operational independence to achieve and maintain price stability.  I would like to
say a few words on how we got there, and our experiences since the passage of the Reserve
Bank Act, in order to put my comments about the practice of monetary policy into context.
The transition to inflation targeting did not arise out of a vacuum.  It reflects several factors:
New Zealand’s own experience with activist monetary policy and high inflation, other
countries’ experiences with nominal targeting regimes, and a ground-swell of academic
opinion.
To begin with the facts: New Zealand experienced double digit inflation for most of the period
from the first oil shock through to the late 1980s.  Cumulative inflation (on a CPI basis)
between 1974 and 1988 (inclusive) was 480 per cent.  A brief, but temporary, fall in inflation
to below 5 per cent occurred in the early 1980s, but only as a result of a wage, price, dividend
and interest rate freeze.  Throughout the period, monetary policy faced multiple and varying
objectives that were seldom clearly specified, and only rarely consistent with achievement of
inflation reduction.  As a result of this experience, inflation expectations were deeply
entrenched in New Zealand society.  Distortions were pervasive.  Nor was there any
compensation in output: real growth over the same period averaged only 1.8 per cent annually.3
At the same time, an emerging consensus challenged the support for activist monetary policy.
You will all know that this challenge was long in development, indeed since the 1950s when
Friedman remarked famously about the “long and variable lags” that undermined the scope for
activist monetary policy.  Experience world-wide was lending credence to the view that
monetary policy is neutral in the long run and that a central bank cannot “buy” a permanent
increase in output by tolerating a bit more inflation.
However, inflation targeting did not spring immediately from this background.  It simply
brought us to the point, in the mid-1980s, where reform-minded members of government, the
Treasury and the Reserve Bank saw the need to pursue a nominal anchor.  This in itself was
not particularly innovative.  The idea was well-established in many other central banks.  That
said, perhaps there were some advantages to being a late starter.  It would have been easy to
adopt the exchange rate as a nominal anchor, or to pursue money targeting.  However,
problems that other countries were experiencing with unstable money demand seemed to rule
out money targeting, particularly since we were engaging in a programme of reform that
included extensive financial liberalisation.  These issues were also becoming well-documented
in the academic literature, and the same literature also made it clear that exchange rate
targeting inevitably meant accepting whatever inflation rate seemed appropriate to the central
bank whose currency was targeted.  Moreover, given experience with an election cycle in
monetary policy, academic notions of “incentives” and “commitment” that might have
remained obscure began to make sense.
Against this background the idea began to form that it might be better to target inflation
directly.  The transition, however, was not well-defined.  It was even less clear how to go
about targeting inflation.  Primary liquidity, for example, was for some time used operationally
as an instrument, though to this day it is often mistakenly argued that it was a target itself.  I
will simply note that history can be surprisingly confusing, even for those who were there.  So
let me cut to 1988.
By then the inflation rate was, for all intents and purposes, the nominal anchor.  The question
at that stage was whether there was an institutional arrangement that could achieve credibility
and lock in gains from commitment.  The Reserve Bank Act of 1989 mandated price stability
as the single goal for monetary policy.  Further, a Policy Targets Agreement, signed by the
Governor and the Minister of Finance (now the Treasurer) on behalf of the elected
government, set out specific targets by which monetary policy performance could be assessed
during the period of the Governor’s term.
Several points are notable about the Reserve Bank Act and the Policy Targets Agreements
(PTAs).  First, the Act grants operational independence to the Bank to pursue its goal.  This is
backed up with an emphasis on accountability to the Government of the day.  This contracting
arrangement has many of the features of optimal contracting that have attracted so much
attention in the academic literature.  Secondly, what the Act describes as “stability in the
general level of prices” has been defined in the PTAs as inflation bands, rather than price level
targeting.  To the extent that “bygones are bygones” with inflation targeting, this should result
in lower instrument volatility than price level targeting.  Finally, and perhaps most obviously,
there is only one objective listed, that of price stability.  This was clearly intended to lend
credibility to the whole arrangement.  However, in practice a single objective does not mean
that the monetary authority need be blind to other macroeconomic considerations, and I will
come back to this point soon.4
Before doing so, however, I would like to remark briefly on the years since the passage of the
Act.  In so doing, I want to emphasise that the enactment of this legislation has not in itself
guaranteed anything, still less successful monetary policy.
Our experience of inflation targeting may be divided into two periods.  The first period, from
1987 through the end of 1991, saw inflation fall from double-digit levels to within the then 0 to
2 per cent target.  Nominal interest rates and the exchange rate fell, output growth was very
low, and unemployment rose.  I note in passing that this was also a period of wide-ranging
macro- and microeconomic reforms.
The second period from 1992 to the present has seen something that more closely resembles a
conventional business cycle.  Earlier on, a sharp rise in growth was accompanied by falling
unemployment.  Inflationary pressures emerged, pushing underlying inflation outside the 0 to 2
per cent range in 1996.  Monetary conditions were tightened substantially, with 90 day rates
up from 4.5 per cent to 9.5 per cent in 1994 and the trade-weighted exchange rate appreciating
very substantially until early 1997.  Recently, as growth has slowed and inflationary pressures
abated, we have been able to ease monetary conditions.
The key accomplishment of this later period is that for the first time in many years New
Zealand has experienced a full business cycle without rapidly rising inflation or pronounced
fiscal imbalances.  However, achieving our inflation target has proven very challenging indeed.
Along the way, we have learnt some lessons, and it is to the practice of monetary policy under
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Inflation targeting: practice and evolution
This issue can be approached in two complementary ways: what an inflation-targeting
framework gives you, and what it does not.
First, what do I think we have gained from the framework itself?  I think one benefit of moving
to our framework is that inflation targeting has largely been taken off the political agenda.  All
but one of the political parties in the 1996 election campaign - New Zealand’s first under a
proportional representation system - had some policy of inflation targeting and central bank
independence in their manifestos.  At the same time increases in transparency have seen the
level of economic debate improve considerably.
It is also likely that the introduction of the framework brought with it some changes in the way
people form their expectations and make decisions.  But that is far from saying that the
framework meant that price stability was somehow locked in for all time.  I am sceptical that
moving to an inflation-targeting regime automatically confers credibility.  Our experience
suggests that credibility has to be earned.  Once again in matters of economic policy, we learn
that there is no free lunch.
This leads me to consider what a framework like this does not give you.  Put simply, we have
been learning that a monetary policy goal is not the same as a monetary policy regime.  The
Reserve Bank Act and subsequent Policy Targets Agreements provide a target for monetary
policy, but they do not tell us how to get there.  Nor do they sprinkle a kind of magical
“credibility dust” over the macroeconomic landscape, ensuring that price stability is here to
stay.
In the same way as we have been learning about how to pursue our goal, it is interesting to see
a growing academic literature that addresses the question of an optimal policy framework.
One part of this literature addresses whether the monetary authority should react to all types of7
shocks.  For example, some argue that we should lean against demand shocks but
accommodate supply shocks.  Others argue that it is persistence that matters: the monetary
authority should attempt to see through transitory shocks, and focus on shocks with
permanent effects.
Another part of this literature derives optimal reaction functions for the monetary authority
given assumptions about our social preferences.  Do we attach some importance to low
volatility of interest rates, for example?  A notable feature of this research is that the optimal
rules tend to favour gradual adjustment to shocks rather than very aggressive reaction.
Similarly, the efficient policy frontier literature points to the possible existence of a trade-off
between the variability - not the level - of inflation and output.  In practice, therefore, many
different choices for the paths of monetary instruments are available at each quarter, all of
which are consistent with achieving the target.
As we have gained experience of inflation targeting, we have been learning about these
choices.  And it seems clear that, in practice, inflation targeting need not exclude other
macroeconomic considerations.  Because successful inflation targeting requires us to respect
the lags between policy actions and inflation outcomes, it requires us to be forward-looking.
The gradual adjustment that this implies can be a good approximation of an optimal policy that
places some value on smoothing output and monetary instruments.
Getting the balance right is, of course, rather tricky.  Targeting inflation at a policy horizon
that is too long will let shocks have too much impact and allow unnecessary price level drift.
An horizon that is too short may create excessive volatility, and perhaps even instability.  In a
small open economy this picture becomes even more confusing.  An optimal policy should
respect the lags in the real economy, but in countries such as New Zealand there are also
significant direct effects on the price level from exchange rate movements.  Insofar as the
monetary authority can influence the real exchange rate in the short run, this would appear to
be a quick and effective way of addressing an incipient inflation problem.  However, our
experience with persistent non-tradeables inflation has given us reason to rely less on direct
exchange rate effects.  At the same time as our understanding of monetary transmission has
improved, our attention has focused more and more on real economy channels.  In so doing,
we would like to describe ourselves, in Lars’ terms, as “flexible” inflation targeters, rather than
“strict” targeters.
But what “inflation” are we actually targeting?  In practice, a tension exists between targeting
a truly underlying measure of inflation and targeting a measure that people can actually see.  I
don’t see any easy solution to this.  Common sense dictates that we do not respond to the
effects of interest rate movements that show up directly in the New Zealand CPI, for example.
Should we also exclude increases in government charges?  One argument says yes - they don’t
have anything to do with monetary conditions, after all.  Reacting to them would only generate
more volatility in monetary conditions and output.  On the other hand, they are a cost that
undoubtedly affects people’s standards of living, and so not responding puts our external
credibility at risk.  In practice, we do sometimes “caveat” out components of the CPI, but a
situation where the monetary authority constructs the data that is used to measure its
performance is clearly not ideal.
In any case, regardless of which inflation measure we target operationally, in the New Zealand
framework the target is not expressed as a point but as a band.  The band allows flexibility in
the face of unexpectedly large shocks that are not caveated, and could be thought of as
another way of avoiding excessive volatility.  At the end of 1996 a new PTA was negotiated,8
with a new target range, 0 to 3 per cent.  Does this reflect some change in our preferences?
Or did we decide that inflation was just too difficult to confine within 0 to 2 per cent?  The
answer is no, and no again, although I have to grant that one advantage of the change is that it
did suddenly put us back within the target band.
I venture instead that while there was no change in our beliefs that prompted the change, there
is probably a lesson revealed by the change.  We were certainly concerned that the move
would cause markets and the public to believe that we had “gone soft” on inflation, and hence
for credibility to be lost.  In retrospect, this seems neither here nor there.  When we were
outside the band during 1996, the debate was not about that we were outside the band, it was
about why we were outside the band.  Credibility is not just an issue at those kinds of
moments, either - we could lose credibility simply by issuing a Monetary Policy Statement that
was judged to be poorly researched, even though inflation itself was well within the band.  To
return to my earlier point, credibility is continually earned by our actions and our account of
policy, and not legislated.
A crucial part of this ongoing process concerns the publication of quarterly forecasts.  We
used to publish forecasts on the basis of assumptions about constant nominal paths for interest
rates and the exchange rate.  Now we publish fully-endogenous paths for monetary conditions,
as well as projected paths for other macro variables.  This change is fundamental: whereas we
used to ask what would happen to inflation if monetary conditions were fixed at a certain level,
this new approach asks, “What is the path for monetary conditions that is required to get
inflation back to its target?”  Hence desired monetary conditions will probably be seen to
change with each quarterly projection, as new information comes to hand and the state of the
economy is re-assessed.  We do not attempt to maintain a veil of secrecy about our projected
conditions; our analysis is open and transparent and subject to scrutiny by financial markets.  I
think that this has been well-received.  It has also introduced a constraint, but a positive one:
financial market commentators and the Bank both find that they have to speak to the facts and
each others arguments, rather than just assert their own opinions.
Inflation targets are thus important in their own right, but they need to be backed up with
projections and analysis.  It does not stop with projections: our annual report is tabled in
Parliament, while the Bank publishes a wide range of materials, communications, and speeches
available to the general public.  We have learnt that we need to continually explain our policy
and our actions, whether that means explaining exemptions from headline inflation,
emphasising the forward-looking nature of policy, or simply re-affirming how we see the role
of inflation targeting in economic policy more generally.
The challenge: policy under uncertainty
I want now to address an outstanding issue concerning the implementation of monetary policy.
As you will know, there is a well-established and highly influential literature that talks about
“rules vs discretion.”  Mention of these words is enough to send some of my staff members
into a fervour about “state contingency” and “time consistency” and other such obscure
notions.  I don’t really want to get into that at all.  Let me suggest instead that in terms of the
practice of monetary policy, “rules versus discretion” is no longer a helpful dichotomy.  For
what, really, are we trying to achieve?  In one sense, all we are doing is trying to get closer to
the optimal rule.  We have learnt that at any given time we could choose several paths for
monetary conditions, all of which are consistent with hitting the inflation target.  We know that9
some of these paths will produce better results than others - we could hit the target just as
successfully while having smaller effects on the real economy, for example.  We also know that
some of the rules that come out of the formal optimal rules literature are very complex indeed.
In order for it to choose the optimal path, the monetary authority is usually assumed to know a
considerable amount about the state of the economy and its workings.  In practice, however, a
binding commitment to a single rule is simply not feasible because not enough is known about
the structure of the economy or the shocks it will face.
This is the key issue that faces us: economic uncertainty.  And here is the challenge: to design
rules that yield results that get close to optimal rules, yet at the same time are simple and
robust under wide-ranging uncertainty.
To flesh out this issue a bit further, let’s consider the implications of three different types of
uncertainty.
The first is what I will call event uncertainty.  This simply recognises that we live in a
stochastic world and that we cannot anticipate future shocks.  We can, however, make
judgements as to the probability of certain kinds of events, and this may well affect our policy
choices.  What if our probabilities were skewed, for example, such that the risks of inflationary
shocks lay on the upside of a projection?  This could well temper a sudden easing in monetary
policy, leading instead to a more cautious approach to a change in conditions.
I would be a happy central banker indeed, however, if all we had to confront was event
uncertainty.  In fact, we often face considerable difficulty even assessing where we are now, let
alone in the future.  Lags in the arrival of data, errors and data revisions all make it difficult to
judge the starting point for a projection.  Moreover, macroeconomic theory requires us to use
concepts that don’t map perfectly well to the data - GDP, for example, is only an imprecise
proxy for underlying economic activity, and some key notions such as potential output are not
even observable.
We approach this starting point uncertainty in two ways.  The first and obvious response is to
try to get the answer right, and the Bank devotes considerable resources to surveys, indicators
and maintaining contacts with the business community.  It is here that the formal framework
we use for projections can really be beneficial.  We have recently begun using a structural
macroeconomic model as a tool to help prepare forecasts and policy analysis.  The strength of
models is not that we’re going to be able to predict the future - we know that we will be
wrong - instead, it comes from being able to conduct counterfactual exercises.  What if, for
example, the present output gap differed from our estimate by, say, x per cent?  Would we
then choose a different path for monetary conditions?  Secondly, at the same time as we try to
improve our monitoring of the economy, we have begun a research programme to look for
policy rules that are robust to doubts about the starting point.
Finally, there is a third type of uncertainty, model uncertainty.  I have to concur with Bennett
McCallum when he argues that the key stumbling block for policy formation is uncertainty
about the way the macroeconomy works.
What is so special about model uncertainty?  My staff would say that it is more problematic for
results since model uncertainty is multiplicative, whereas other types of uncertainty are
additive.  What do I take from this?  Bad events and mistakes about the state of the economy
are hardly desirable, but at least we have some opportunity to recover, re-assess, and to get it
right next time.  If we make mistakes about the way the world works, however, then we stand10
to get it wrong all of the time.  It also tells me that results that are highly model-specific are of
little use, and therefore the challenge for economists is to develop policy rules that are robust
under uncertainty about key parameters and structures.
I will finish here by noting that model uncertainty is also an important element in explaining the
behaviour of monetary policy-makers.  Measured against the optimising models of some
economists, we central bankers can appear rather doltish, moving too slowly and too late.
Why should this be?  The basic answer is model uncertainty, which means that when the
monetary authority adjusts instruments, it cannot be sure about the impact on the economy.
As argued nearly three decades ago by William Brainard, this introduces caution in the policy
responses, and appropriately so.
Reflections on policy
I would like to finish with some brief reflections on policy directions, both closer to your home
and more generally.
First, does any of what I have spoken about have any relevance to Europe?
Clearly the European Central Bank will face considerable challenges.  From my own vantage
point, I can attest that it is difficult enough to coordinate the monetary conditions for one small
country.  In recent quarters, some wags have suggested - not entirely tongue-in-cheek - that a
separate exchange rate for the Auckland metropolitan region has been needed.
The problems of monetary coordination over such a disparate zone as Euroland have been well
documented and I don’t propose to add anything here.  Nonetheless, are there some lessons
about inflation targeting that could apply to Europe?  I certainly do not propose to tell
European member states how to conduct monetary policy.  However, it seems to me that a
move to inflation-targeting would involve facing the same kind of questions as we have - and
continue to do so.  How strictly should inflation be brought back to target?  How do you
balance the effects of interest rates with the exchange rate?  How is credibility to be achieved
and maintained?
Regardless of whether inflation targeting is pursued or not, the implications of uncertainty are
important for any monetary policy regime.  In many ways this might apply especially to
Europe, since uncertainty about the structure of the European economy - model uncertainty -
is likely to be high.
How should this affect the debate?  Discussions of policy rules can make the monetary policy
problem appear easy.  Armed with a model, all that is required is a statement of the objective
function, the constraints under which the problem is to be solved, and the solution is relatively
straightforward.  But it is important to ask: when and how can we treat monetary policy as an
engineering problem, and when shouldn’t we?
It is obvious that uncertainty can make policy harder.  I think the profession is realising,
however, that uncertainty is more fundamental than that.  Lars reminds us, for example, that
under uncertainty it is no longer possible to specify rules simply in terms of target variables.
Rules for targets can only be expressed in terms of the respective forecasts, rather than the ex
post values.11
But to get at the full dimension of the problem, we need to get at issues of credibility  and
active learning by both private agents and the monetary authority.  I would like to encourage
you all to venture into this kind of research, because I think it is here that academic economists
can make another substantial contribution to the practice of monetary policy.
In the meantime, it serves central bankers well to be reminded, as Alan Blinder has done, that
while monetary policy makes progress as a science, it is still something of a black art.  Let me
add my own measure of progress to that.  Perhaps when we started inflation targeting we were
uncertain about how much we knew.  Today I can confidently say that I’m certain that we are
uncertain.  I’m just looking for a few good rules, that’s all.
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